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Foreword: Health Care Reform in the
United States - The Presidential
Task Force
Lawrence 0. Gostint
The United States is on the verge of major health care reform. Hillary
Rodham Clinton has led a cabinet-level task force, assisted by a large health
policy committee. During the 1992 Presidential campaign, Bill Clinton re-
jected previous reform proposals that focused on a single-payer health insur-
ance system modelled on the Canadian system,' or on a system in which
employers would be required to provide health insurance or pay into a fund
for the uninsured ("pay or play"). 2 Mr. Clinton proposed a system of "man-
aged competition,"'3 first developed by the Jackson Hole group in the late
1970s.4 The Presidential Task Force on Health Care Reform built on the
concept of managed competition by combining it with global expenditure
budgets.
Managed competition restructures the market for health care services
into competing, prepaid health plans, giving providers built-in incentives to
offer a comprehensive benefits package at the lowest cost. 5 It is a purchasing
strategy that uses rules for competition to award more subscribers and reve-
t Executive Director, American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics. Mr. Gostin is a Visiting
Professor at Georgetown University Law Center, and at the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene
and Public Health. He is also a member of the Presidential Committee on Health Care Reform.
The views presented in this Essay do not represent the findings or conclusions of the Presidential
Committee.
I See, e.g., Stefie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, 4 National Health Program: Northern
Light at the End of the Tunnel, 262JAMA 2136 (1989); see also Kevin Grumbach et al., Liberal Benefits,
Conservative Spending, 265 JAMA 2549 (1991); Paul D. Wellstone & Ellen R. Shaffer, The American
Health Secunty Act - A Single-Paer Proposal, 328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1489 (1993).
2 See, e.g., John D. Rockefeller IV, A Call For Action." The Pepper Commission's Blueprint For Health
Care Reform, 265 JAMA 2507 (1991); see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCESS TO HEALTH
CARE: STATES RESPOND To GROWING CRIsIs 32-35 (June 1992) (describing the Massachusetts
"pay or play" plan enacted in 1988).
3 See generally Bill Clinton, The Clinton Health Care Plan, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 804 (1992) (for
an overview of the Clinton Health Care plan, as proposed during the 1992 Presidential
campaign).
4 See generally Alain C. Enthoven, Consumer-Choice Health Plan: 4 Vational Health Insurance Propo-
sal Based on Regulated Competition in the Private Sector, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 709 (1978) (detailing
the Jackson Hole group's proposal).
5 See AMERICAN MEDICAL PEER REVIEW ASSOCIATION, MANAGED COMPETITION AND THE ROLE
OF QUALITY OVERSIGHT (Mar. 1993).
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nues to those health plans that provide higher quality care at a lower cost. 6
Scholars have presented compelling critiques of the current health care
system on philosophical, 7 public health, 8 and financial 9 grounds. The system
has failed to provide universal access to health care with an equitable sharing
of benefits and burdens. An estimated thirty-seven million people do not
have health care coverage, with many more people inadequately covered.' 0
Disparities in access to health care have been shown on grounds of socioeco-
nomic status, I I race and ethnicity, 12 and gender.'
3
The current system has also failed to control escalating health care costs
relative to health care expenditures in other countries. The United States
spent more than $666 billion on health care in 1990, approximately 12% of
the nation's gross national product ("GNP").' 4 Health care expenditures are
projected to reach $1.6 trillion, between 16 and 18 percent of the gross do-
mestic product ("GDP"), by the end of the decade if effective controls are not
instituted. 15 These figures stand in stark contrast to the percentage of GNP
that is devoted to health care in countries such as Canada, Germany, Great
Britain, and Japan; they devote from 5.8% to 8.7% of their GNP to health
care. 16
Economists have repeatedly pointed to the reasons for escalating costs in
the U.S. health care system: (1) high administrative costs fueled by bewilder-
ing numbers of third-party payers, ranging from government programs, such
as Medicaid and Medicare, to not-for-profit and for-profit insurers, each with
its own reimbursement policies, reviews, and paperwork; 17 (2) lack of global
budgets at the federal, state, or local levels, and a lack of systematic policies
6 Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed Competition, HEALTH AFF., Supp.
1993, at 24, 29 [hereinafter ttistory and Principles].
7 See, e.g., NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985).
8 See, e.g., H. Denman Scott & Howard B. Shapiro, Universal Insurance for American Health Care,
117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 511 (1992).
9 See, e.g., Robert J. Blendon et a!., The Health Insurance Industry in the Year 2001: One Scenario,
HEALTH AFF., Winter 1991, at 170.
10 BNA, ,Vumber of Uninsured Persons Increases to 36.6 Million in 1991, DAILY LABOR REP., Jan.
12, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (reporting results of the Employee Benefit
Research Institute Study).
I I See Paul H. Wise et al., Racial and Socioeconomic Disparities in Childhood Mortality in Boston, 313
NEw ENG. J. MED. 360, 364 (1985).
12 See Council on Ethical and Jud. Aft., Black-WI'hite Dispanties in Health Care, 263 JAMA 2344
(1990).
3 See John Z. Ayanian & Arnold M. Epstein, Differences in the Use of Procedures Between W1omen
and Men Hospitalized for Coronarv Heart Disease, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 221, 223-25 (1991).
14 Louis W. Sullivan, The Bush Administration s Health Care Plan, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 801,
801 (1992).
15 See Sally T. Sonnenfeld et al., Projection of National Health Expenditures Through the Yea? 2, 000,
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Fall 1991, at 1, 4, 22; see also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFF., PROJECTIONS
OF NAIONAL HEALTH EXPENDIURES 14 (Table 1) (Oct. 1992).
16 See George J. Scheiber et al., Health Ctre Systems in Twenty-Four Nations, HEALTH AFF., Fall
1991, at 22, 24. These cost projections are examined with great clarity in Timothy S. Jost &
Sandra J. Tanenbaum, Selling Cost Containment, 19 AM. J. L. & MED. 95, 96-97 (1993).
17 See Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, The Deteriorating Administrative Efficiency of
the U.S. Health Care System, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1253, 1255-56 (1991) (19 to 24 percent of
health care expenditures goes toward administrative expenses, including those of the nation's
insurance companies).
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for prudent allocation of resources based on the cost-effectiveness of treat-
ments; (3) escalating use of advanced technology, such as imaging machines
and bone marrow transplants, without systematic outcomes research that
demonstrates its benefits relative to costs; and (4) few incentives for choosing
lower-cost alternatives at the point of service because consumers seldom
bear, or are even completely aware of, the actual costs of treatment.' 8
Failure to control health care costs has ethical as well as economic impli-
cations. The amount that a nation can afford to spend on a wide range of
services is limited. While resource allocation decisions are highly complex, as
a general matter, imprudent allocation of health care resources can detract
from resources for equally important services, such as housing, food, educa-
tion, and social services.
While it is relatively easy to criticize the current health care system in the
United States, constructing a new one is fraught with complexities and trade-
offs. The plan proposed by the Presidential Task Force should be measured
against the two overarching goals that drove the reform efforts: providing
high-quality care while controlling escalating costs, and providing universal
access with an equitable sharing of benefits and burdens. This Essay focuses
on the objectives of universal access, equity,justice, and choice. In particular,
I inquire as to whether the design features of the new system are likely to
fulfill these objectives.
I. DESIGN FEATURES OF THE NEW SYSTEM
As this Symposium went to press, President Clinton had not made the
design decisions for health care reform. The exact specifications of the new
health care system depend on the package that the President will send to Cap-
itol Hill and the changes that Congress will make in the reform package.
Some of the basic structures and organizing principles of the new system that
are being considered by the President are already the subject of intense pub-
lic scrutiny.
The design being considered would involve new relations between the
federal government and the states, between the public and private sectors,
and between health care financing and delivery. 19 The federal government
would establish the parameters of the new system through national legisla-
tion, regulation, and guidelines, with implementation occurring principally at
the state level. State flexibility would become a hallmark of the new system,
with states having considerable leeway in implementation. Provided that
states follow national parameters (as described below), they probably could
establish very different kinds of health care systems, ranging from a single
payer to managed competition within a budget. Given the strong preference
among many health policy experts for a single-payer system,20 it is extremely
important to emphasize the states' authority to implement such a system. A
18 See Histon and Principles, supra note 6, at 25-27; see also Charles Weller, "Free Choice" as a
Restraint of Trade in American Health Care Delivery and Insurance, 69 IOWA L. REv. 1351 (1984) (cx-
ploring how patients are isolated from the competitive aspects of the health care market).
19 See Paul Starr & Walter A. Zelman, Bridge to Comproise: Competition Under A Budget, HEALTH
AFF., Supp. 1993, at 7, 9.
20 For a related discussion about single-payer systems, see supra note 1.
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large state, for example, might consider establishing a system of managed
competition in urban areas, and a single-payer system in rural areas where
effective competition is constrained by the small number of consumers and
providers.
The new system will provide the right to health care to all citizens and
lawful residents of the United States, all of whom will receive health security
cards, transferrable to any area of the country. The card would also guaran-
tee access to health care independent of employment or other eligibility crite-
ria. Therefore, the new system will address the American public's concern for
long-term security in health care - coverage would be portable and move
with the individual if he or she changed jobs or lived in another part of the
country.
A. NEW SYSTEM STRUCTURES
The basic structures being considered for the new system are the Na-
tional Health Board, Health Alliances, and Accountable Health Plans
("AHPs"). Broadly speaking, the National Health Board would establish fed-
eral parameters for purchasing, providing, and accessing care in the new sys-
tem; Health Alliances would, on behalf of consumers in their regions,
contract with plans to provide high-quality, low-cost care within their budg-
ets; and AHPs would provide care on a prepaid, per capita basis.
1. National Health Board
The National Health Board is likely to be a quasi-governmental authority
(perhaps structurally similar to the Securities Exchange Commission), estab-
lished at the federal level, with members appointed by the President. It would
provide or implement federal standards for the overall design and operation
of the new system. Its functions would include: determining a comprehen-
sive benefits package that might change over time; establishing national, state,
and/or Health Alliance budgets; setting rules for managed competition that
protect the interests of consumers; setting rules and guidelines for the pru-
dent allocation of resources, particularly for highly expensive treatments that
provide little benefit; and establishing a uniform data reporting system to
help measure the performance and quality of competing health plans. The
National Health Board might establish panels on specialized areas, such as
ethics, data protection (privacy), or public health.
2. Health Alliances
Health Alliances are conceived as aggressive purchasers of health plans
on behalf of large numbers of consumers. At an earlier stage in Task Force
deliberations and in relevant literature, they were referred to as Health Insur-
ance Purchasing Cooperatives ("HIPCs") or Purchasing Cooperatives. 2 1
Health Alliances would act as collective purchasing agents for all consumers
in the new system. Medicaid recipients will likely be "folded into" the new
21 See generally Walter A. Zelman, Who Should Govern the Purchasing Cooperative?, HEALTH AFF.,
Supp. 1993, at 49.
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system. Large employers (with 1,000 or more employees) will probably be
permitted to "opt out" of the Alliance system or act as their own Alliance.
At least one Health Alliance will operate in each state, with perhaps 100
Alliances throughout the country. Alliances would be subject to state regula-
tion, perhaps organized as not-for-profit organizations. Alliances would not
deliver care or directly pay providers. They would contract with a number of
health plans, including Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs"), Pre-
ferred Provider Organizations ("PPOs"), and a traditional free-choice-of-pro-
vider indemnity plan. Since Health Alliances would control a dominant part
of the market for health care services in their regions, they should be able to
negotiate strongly for lower-cost, higher-quality services for consumers.
B. NEW SYSTEM FINANCING
Financial contributions for the new system will be shared by employers,
consumers, and government. The most likely option would be for each
Health Alliance to set an annual, community-rated premium based on the
least expensive plan in the region that provides a satisfactory standard of care
("the benchmark plan"), or on a weighted average of the least expensive
plans. The Health Alliance would pay no more than this benchmark pre-
mium. Consumers who choose to enroll in more expensive plans would pay
the marginal difference in cost. Employers would be required to pay a mini-
mum share of the premium for health coverage (e.g., 75%) for employees and
their dependents, although they could choose to pay more. Employees would
pay the remaining portion of the premium. To ensure that health coverage is
affordable for employers and employees in low-wage industries, a cap would
be set on the amount paid (e.g., 7% of payroll for employers and 2% of fam-
ily income for employees). 2 2
Unemployed, self-employed, and part-time workers would also be re-
quired to contribute. However, federal government subsidies would be avail-
able for low-income individuals and families. Government subsidies would be
based on a sliding scale that has yet to be developed. Government, for exam-
ple, might pay the full premium for persons at or below the poverty line, with
diminishing payments for those up to 200% of the poverty line.23 Separate
streams of federal funding would be provided for those with special needs -
for example, disabled persons and the very poor who are currently on Medi-
caid and are eligible for some long-term care. The additional amount of fed-
eral revenues needed to fund the reform package has been estimated at
around $100-$150 billion per year.2 4 However, this amount may be offset by
the amount already spent on acute care under Medicaid (approximately $62
billion) .25
22 Starr & Zelman, supra note 19, at 17.
23 Clearly, the government could be less generous, offering a full subsidy for those at or
below 50% of the poverty line, with diminishing payments for those up to the poverty line.
24 See Robert Pear, Health Care Costs M ay Be Increased S100 Billion A Year, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
1993, at Al [hereinafter Health Care Costs].
25 See John F. Sheils et al., Potential Public Expenditures Under Managed Competition, HEAL rLi AFF.,
Supp. 1993, at 229, 231, 239; Starr & Zelman, supra note 19, at 17; see also John K. Iglehart, The
American Health Care System - Medicaid, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 896 (1993).
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While health care reform places additional financial burdens on the fed-
eral government, principally to provide universal coverage for low-income
persons, it provides financial benefits to the states. The principal benefit
would be the phasing in of Medicaid's acute-care provisions to the new sys-
tem.2" Additionally, public hospitals and clinics that provide uncompensated
emergency care for the uninsured will have a considerably lighter burden.
Persons with good health care will presumably become more productive citi-
zens who are better able to work. This, in turn, ought to reduce state welfare
costs. Finally, Hillary Rodham Clinton has announced an intention to fold
the health care components of workers' compensation and automobile insur-
ance into the new system, with concomitant savings to states, employers, and
consumers.
2 7
C. ORGANIZING NATIONAL PRINCIPLES FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM
While states will have substantial flexibility in implementing the new
health care system, all participants will have to abide by the key organizing
principles of reform. These principles will likely be part of a federal statute
proposed by President Clinton that will preempt contrary state legislative
provisions. Federal law that is inconsistent with the new plan, such as various
portions of the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 2 8
are also likely to be overridden. 29
1. Universal Coverage
After a phase-in period, all citizens and lawful residents of the United
States would be entitled to health care coverage either within the new system
or through other federal programs, such as Medicare. To avoid a "free rider"
problem, all eligible persons will be required to enroll in an accountable
health plan and pay the designated premium. 30
2. Open Enrollment
All health plans that participate in the system would have to be open to
all persons who hold health security cards and choose to be in the plan, sub-
ject to space limitations. An open-enrollment period would probably occur
annually. No conditions based on health status or other risk-selection criteria
would be permitted. While health plans may have geographic catchment ar-
eas, they would not be permitted to gerrymander their areas to avoid certain
populations because of their risk profile, race, or socioeconomic status.
2, Sheils et al., supra nole 25, at 239.
27 See Robert Pear, lealth Care Plan to Cover lInjnes onJob and Roads, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1993,
at Al.
28 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993).
29 See Wendy K. Mariner, Problems with Employer-Provided lealth Insurance - The Employee Retire-
ment Income Secuority Act and Hlealth Care Reform, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1682, 1685 (1992); see also
Lawrence 0. Gostin & Alan I. Widiss, I'hat's IWrng with the ERISA Vacuum?." Employers' Freedom to
Limit llealth Care Coverage Provided by Risk Retention Plans, 269 JAMA 2527, 2529-31 (1993).
30 If a person who is not enrolled needs health services, some attempt to collect current
premiums and recoup past premiums would probably be built into the system.
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3. Community Rating
Health plans will not be able to exclude, or to differentiate according to
treatment or charges, any individual or group, regardless of medical condi-
tion. Plans will be required to use community rating. Under community rat-
ing, premiums are based on expected costs for all persons in the community,
not on a particular group's historical costs (known as experience rating).
Consequently, plans will not be permitted to charge higher premiums for per-
sons who are older, sicker, poorer, or disabled. Health plans will not be al-
lowed to use pre-existing condition provisions or discriminate against
persons who have had, currently have, or are predicted to have higher health
care costs.
The amount of money paid to health plans, however, would be risk-ad-
justed to cover the real costs of taking care of higher-risk patients, such as
those with chronic disease. If health plans are paid approximately the true
cost for patients with AIDS, cancer, heart disease, or schizophrenia, for exam-
ple, they may be more likely to structure the delivery of services to provide
specialized, expert, or intensive care for chronic, costly diseases. Health
plans would no longer have an incentive to hire too few or inexperienced
infectious disease practitioners to discourage persons with HIV infection or
disease from joining their plan. The National Health Board would set specifi-
cations for risk adjustment.
4. Comprehensive Benefits Package
All health plans would be required to provide the same standard health
benefits package. The package is not intended to offer minimal services, but
rather a reasonably robust set of benefits. The benefits package would in-
clude clinical prevention services, acute-care services, hospitalization, mental
health services, alcohol and drug dependency services, outpatient services,
emergency care, prescription drugs, and a scaled-down version of dental care.
Long-term care would remain uncovered, except for very limited services, but
poor or disabled populations could be reimbursed under separate funding
streams.
There are three justifications for a national, uniform benefits package.
First, such a package guarantees Americans all reasonable health care services
necessary to promote health, prevent and treat sickness and disease, and alle-
viate pain and suffering. Second, a uniform package is intended to facilitate
competition among plans and informed choice among consumers. At pres-
ent, consumers have great difficulty choosing among health insurance plans
because the confusing array of benefits that each plan provides makes com-
parison virtually impossible. If plans offer the same benefits package, they
must ensure quality and a fair price in order to compete. If consumers can be
assured a uniform benefits package, they can compare plans based on quality
and cost. Third, the uniform package prevents plans from withdrawing serv-
ices for risk-selection purposes. For example, it would prevent plans from
offering inferior or no benefits to drug-dependent or mentally ill persons with
the intention that these individuals will choose other plans.
Of course, the services that health plans offer are still vulnerable in the
new system. While all plans must provide a uniform benefits package, the
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actual services offered in the same package can vary widely. Indeed, one
might expect the services to be better in more expensive plans than in the
benchmark (i.e., least expensive) plan. More expensive plans might have
more modern and a greater number of laboratories, imaging machines, and
other equipment and services; more experienced and a greater number of
specialists; and shorter waiting times for services. While some of these "ex-
tras" may or may not improve quality, the plans will be perceived as "better"
even though they provide the same benefits package. The success of the new
system will depend, in part, on whether differences in services among plans
have more to do with convenience and comfort (e.g., longer waiting times in
non-emergency cases or nicer carpets) than with the quality of health services
(e.g., lower morbidity and mortality resulting from better treatment
outcomes).
5. Quality Assessment
To help ensure the overall quality of services that health plans offer, and
to promote effective consumer choice, the National Health Board and Health
Alliances would routinely measure the quality of services that health plans
offer. The National Health Board, for example, would require quality mea-
surements in the form of a "report card" that all Health Alliances would pub-
lish and make available to consumers.
The report card might measure: (i) consumer satisfaction (e.g., percent-
age of enrollees satisfied with the plan or satisfied with their primary care
physician, percentage of enrollees leaving the plan, and the number of com-
plaints filed); (ii) access to care (e.g., waiting times to see primary care physi-
cians and specialists); (iii) clinical prevention services (e.g., rates for
vaccinations, mammograms, prenatal care, HIV or tuberculosis screening);
and (iv) outcomes (e.g., percentage of low birth weight infants, nursing home
or hospital patients with bedsores, or mortality after a heart attack or stroke).
Quality assessment, of course, is far more complicated than a short "re-
port card" can reflect. Differences in outcomes can reveal differences in stan-
dards of care, or differences in patient profiles. Quality measurements that
might be informative for one population may be inadequate for another. For
example, a plan may receive an overall high satisfaction rating, but the rating
may be very low among underserved groups, such as disabled or mentally ill
persons.
Finally, measurement standards will need to change over time. Some
plans that offer excellent care may perform less well on the indicators that
happen to be used in any given year. At the same time, plans might "game"
the system by channelling resources only to measured areas. The result
would be high marks on the "report card," but otherwise inferior quality
services.
II. ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HEALTH CARE REFORM:
MEASURING THE NEW SYSTEM AGAINST KEY ETHICAL
VALUES
One of the most interesting features of the health care reform process
has been Hillary Rodham Clinton's establishment of a cluster on "Ethical
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Foundations of the New System" in the Presidential Working Group. 3 1 The
"Ethical Foundations" Cluster identified fifteen ethical values and principles
for the new health care system: (i) health care's fundamental ethical impor-
tance (providing opportunities for a decent life); (ii) universal access (without
financial or non-financial barriers); (iii) comprehensive benefits (to meet the
full range of health care needs); (iv) equal benefits (differences in care reflect-
ing differences in needs, not individual or group differences); (v) communal
sharing of risks (spreading uneven costs and burdens of meeting health care
needs across the entire community); (vi) progressive financing (payments for
health care based on ability to pay); (vii) intergenerational solidarity (meeting
needs at each stage of life and equitably sharing benefits and burdens across
generations); (viii) prudent allocation of resources (wise allocation of re-
sources to favor cost-effective health care services over other important, com-
peting social goods); (ix) efficacious treatments (services of established
efficacy and benefit, with research to assess current medical interventions and
produce innovative treatments); (x) high-quality services (research and moni-
toring to assess quality and provide information for informed consumer
choice); (xi) administrative efficiency (minimizing administrative complexity
and expense); (xii) individual choice (protecting, respecting, and facilitating
effective individual choice about health care, including choice of plans, health
care professionals, and delivery of services); (xiii) responsibility for health
(encouraging and facilitating individual responsibility for protecting and pro-
moting a person's own health and the health of the family); (xiv) professional
integrity (respecting the expertise and integrity of health care professionals
and protecting the health care professional-patient relationship); and (xv)
procedural fairness (fair, open, and democratically accountable design, opera-
tion, and governance of the health care system, including fair grievance
procedures).
Using these and other ethical values as yardsticks for the design and fu-
ture operation of the health care system provides a built-in standard for ob-
jective, ongoing assessment of the reform efforts. Elucidating each of these
values and measuring the design features of the new system against them is a
complex and time-consuming, but necessary task. Here, I provide only a
sketch of the arguments on a few of the most important issues: access, equity,
justice, and choice. These ethical values already have strong intellectual
foundations in philosophical literature. 32
A. UNIVERSAL AcCESS
Health care is considered a fundamental good because of its efficacy in
protecting and restoring physical and mental functioning, preventing sickness
and premature death, and alleviating pain and suffering. Health care, there-
fore, is indispensable to afford individuals the opportunity to enjoy life. Each
31 The ideas for Section II were generated collectively by Cluster 17 ("Ethical Foundations")
of the health policy working group, chaired by Nancy Dubler and Marion Secundy. My gratitude
goes to all members of this Cluster.
32 See Reinhard Priester, A Values Framework for Health System Reform, HEALTH AFF., Spring
1992, at 84, 105 (proposing fair access as the "preeminent value" of U.S. health care). For gen-
eral analyses of ethical frameworks, see DANIELS, supra note 7.
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person has an ethical claim to a fair share of health care resources without
unreasonable financial or non-financial barriers. The system should offer
comprehensive services to meet the full range of health care needs, independ-
ent of the economic, social, racial, or other personal status of the individual or
group.
Formidable barriers to access to health care exist in America. Major im-
pediments are erected by financing arrangements that are inadequate to reim-
burse individuals for health care. Many non-financial barriers are also
present, and include geographic isolation, racial or gender discrimination,
linguistic and cultural barriers, and poorly planned distribution of services
and providers.
The health care reform bill will focus primarily on financial barriers to
access. The new system would guarantee all citizens and lawful residents the
right to a health security card and the right to enroll in a health plan that
provides a comprehensive benefits package. These rights are afforded to in-
dividuals regardless of ability to pay, employment status, pre-existing condi-
tions, or other risk factors. The plan, therefore, establishes a system that
would substantially remedy the central financial barriers to health care access.
Under the plan, a federal subsidy would pay for health coverage for the poor;
coverage would be guaranteed should an individual leave a job or move to
another part of the country; and persons could not be denied coverage or
have coverage capped or withdrawn if they were or became sick.
The central trade-off in providing coverage for the millions of individuals
who are currently uninsured or underinsured is the monetary cost (estimated
at between $100-$150 billion), 33 as well as the political costs of proposing
new taxes. A likely compromise would be to phase federal subsidies into the
system and provide less generous subsidies for the poor. These dual policies
- "phase-in" and smaller subsidies - pose the most significant problems in
achieving the ethical value of universal access to health care.
The currently uninsured are not likely to obtain immediate coverage
under the new system. A phase-in period ranging from one year to an un-
specified future time could be considered. Suppose the phase-in period were
to take place shortly before or after the next Presidential election, or that the
date for bringing the poor into the new system was left unspecified (e.g., until
sufficient cost savings were obtained from the new system). This would leave
the poor vulnerable to both the political process and the efficiency of the new
system.
Political judgments about providing an entitlement to the poor vary con-
siderably over time and across political parties. A real risk exists that the poor
would never be brought into the new system or would be subject to inordi-
nate delays. The most disturbing scenario would link the future entitlements
of the poor to the realization of cost savings under the new system. Since the
proposed system of managed competition is not based on extended experi-
ence in other countries or at the state level, the amount of savings is difficult
to determine. Even if savings are apparent, it is uncertain who would be the
new system's winners and losers. If most of the savings accrue to the states,
33 See Health Care Costs, supra note 24.
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public hospitals, or the insurance industry, the federal government will not
necessarily end up in a better position to finance the uninsured. If the federal
deficit remains high due to increases in spending in other areas and/or a fail-
ure to obtain sufficient increases in revenue sources, the health of the poor
would become a hostage to the political process. Universal access to health
care without financial barriers represents the moral core of health care re-
form. Perhaps the single most important design feature would be folding the
uninsured into the new system within a relatively short period of time that is
unequivocally specified in the federal health care reform statute.
Not only will every citizen and lawful resident eventually be entitled to
health care, but they will also be required to register with a Health Alliance
and pay the premium. If the government mandates that every American join
a health plan, it has a corollary responsibility to ensure that financial assist-
ance is afforded to those who truly cannot afford the premium. This requires
"means testing," which raises a host of troubling questions. The most impor-
tant questions are who has the right to be subsidized, at what level, and how is
qualification to be determined? The subsidy level is important, since it must
encompass as many individuals and families as possible who would find it a
hardship to pay the health premium. Were the full subsidy to be provided
only for persons at, for example, forty percent or less of the poverty line, with
a sliding scale up to the poverty line, it would leave out many needy people.
What legal and moral rights would government have to force payment of the
premium? Could government withhold health care from those who did not
pay ("free riders")? Consider the case of a young, healthy adult who decides
not to register or pay a health premium. When that person becomes ill and
seeks care, he or she will not be turned away. Instead, an attempt to register
that person at the point of service will be required. This might well include
penalties for failing to register and pay, as well as recovery of some past
premiums.
Those who have watched the Medicaid system over a number of decades
have described the disincentives and humiliation of the process of qualifying
through means testing.3 4 Individuals who are asked many probing questions
about their financial position, family, and other personal or health character-
istics often do not come forward. They may be too embarrassed or confused
by the process, particularly if they do not speak English or are of different
cultural backgrounds. The simplest and most respectful method of means
testing is through a negative income tax. 3 5 Those eligible for subsidy might
receive a subsidy that could be paid directly to the Health Alliance. The new
health care system ought not to repeat many of the problems that have
plagued other entitlement programs in the past.
The decision to limit health coverage to citizens and lawful residents also
poses difficulties for universal access. Some safety net must be available to
34 See, e.g., Stephen H. Long & John L. Palmer, Financing Health Care, in INCOME-TESTED
TRANSFER PROGRAMS: THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST 367, 398 (Irwin Garfinkel ed., 1982) (acknowl-
edging that Medicaid recipients may feel stigma because of income testing). See generally, e.g., Lee
Rainwater, Stigma in Income-Tested Programs, in INCOME TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS, Supra, at 19.
35 Under a negative income tax, eligibility depends on income, not inclusion in a limited
category of people. See Irwin Garfinkel, Introduction, in INCOME-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS,
supra note 34, at 1, 4.
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provide urgent care for persons who are not lawful United States residents
and those who are lawful visitors. The new system will have to support essen-
tial service providers who offer uncompensated care. Further, in order to ex-
pand access, the new system should develop imaginative outreach programs,
as well as statutory assurances of privacy, to encourage every eligible person
to register for a health security card.
While President Clinton is committed to universal access to health care,
many problems and complexities can inhibit full access to care. I have dis-
cussed only a few of the more obvious problems with finance and eligibility or
registration requirements. Even if all of the financial impediments are ad-
dressed, many more non-financial barriers will stand in the way of true uni-
versal access. This raises the profound question of the future role of Health
Alliances. Do they act merely as aggressive purchasers of services, or do they
also help plan the delivery of services within their regions? To remedy lack of
access and unequal quality, robust Health Alliances might have to be
equipped to assess and act on service delivery issues. These include the dis-
tribution of primary, secondary, and tertiary care services; public health pro-
grams for vaccinating children to prevent infectious diseases; partner
notification regarding sexually transmitted diseases; and directly observed
therapy for tuberculosis.
B. EQuiTy
Persistent and sometimes substantial differences exist in the quality of
health care in the United States.3 6 Differences occur between the insured and
the uninsured,3 7 the poor and the rich, 3 8 those in public (e.g., Medicaid) and
private programs, 3 9 and between minority and white populations.
40
While equality need not apply rigorously to the distribution of all re-
sources in society, the right to equal health care has a special claim. For ethi-
cal reasons similar to those for access, health care represents a fundamental
social good. Like education, health care is essential to a person's ability to
participate fully in life's opportunities. A healthy population, like an educated
population, is also beneficial to society. A two-tier system of health care, in
which those in the lower tier receive clearly inferior and lower-quality serv-
ices, perpetuates inequities among individuals and groups. These inequali-
ties occur not only in attaining health but, indirectly, in attaining status,
acceptance, and livelihood in society.
How might inequalities develop in a new health care system in which
every citizen and lawful resident has the right to the same health benefits
package? To some firm believers in managed competition, the only differ-
ences among health plans would be in the "frills" - as with, for example,
M3 For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Froyen A. Brennan, An Ethical Perspective on
Health Care Insurance Reform, 19 AM. J. L. & MEn. 37, 42-43 (1993).
37 See Helen R. Burstin et al., Socioeconomic Status and Risk for Substandaid l1edical Care, 268
JAMA 2383 (1992).
38 See Wise et al., supra note 11.
39 See Mark B. Wenneker et al., The Association of Payer With Utilization of Cardiac Procedure in
Mlassachusetts, 264 JAMA 1255 (1990).
4 0 See Council on Ethical and Jud. Aff., supia note 12.
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health centers in nicer areas, with more pleasing decorations and shorter
waiting times for non-emergency cases. They argue that these "extras" may
make a health care experience more pleasant, but not more effective. Skep-
tics of managed competition argue that plans with consumers who pay higher
premiums and come from higher socioeconomic groups will be inherently
higher-quality plans. The added revenue and consumer insistence on high
quality and broad choice will drive these plans to offer more health care pro-
fessionals, including specialists, more qualified and experienced providers,
better-equipped hospitals, more sophisticated machinery, better prevention
services, and shorter waiting times for services. The result will be distinctly
higher-quality care for populations who are already healthier. Those with
greater income, moreover, will be able to purchase supplementary health in-
surance to provide services that are not covered or are inadequately covered
in their health plan.
Ideally, subsidized persons would be fairly distributed among all plans -
from the least to the most expensive in the area of the Health Alliance. This
goal might be achieved in several ways, although society ought to be clear that
it probably will not remove all inequities from the health care system.4 1 The
most likely option would be to limit the differential between the least and
most expensive plans in the Alliance. This design principle, which might be
called "banding," would prohibit any plan in the Alliance region from charg-
ing more than a set percentage over the benchmark plan. The lower the pre-
mium difference allowed, presumably the fewer the inequities. Banding
might also restrain escalating health care costs by setting premium increases
against the rate charged by the least expensive (but still high-quality) plan
within the Alliance.
Depending on the size of the premium difference, however, differences in
quality can and will occur. As the band between the least and most expensive
plans expands, it may be assumed that inequality increases. Whatever differ-
ences in premium price are permitted to exist, another way to attain greater
equity is in the subsidy afforded to low-income populations. If a subsidy only
provides funding for the benchmark premium or less, it is virtually inevitable
that all subsidized populations will be in the least expensive plan(s).
The most certain way to overcome inequity is also the most costly - to
subsidize low-income individuals at the top rate of the banding level. For
example, if a band of 20 percent is permitted between the least and most
expensive plans in the Alliance, the federal government would set the subsidy
rate at 120 percent of the benchmark premium. This would enable the poor
to choose any plan in their geographic catchment areas. A generous subsidy,
41 For example, it is unlikely that any new system in America would prohibit people from
buying a supplemental health benefits package with their own money. While many may argue
that people can spend their money on any service they choose, there are inherent risks for the
new health system. First, if persons can purchase services, they may be taking scarce resources
from others in the new system. The most obvious examples involve truly limited resources, such
as sophisticated equipment or vital organs. Could a private buyer jump the queue for a kidney
transplant over a person who has been waiting in the system? Would society consider that just?
Second, one must consider whether government should continue to subsidize health care
purchases through tax deductions. Arguably, if persons choose to buy supplemental insurance,
they should pay the full and real cost of these services.
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however, would require two trade-offs - cost and "inter-socioeconomic eq-
uity." Whatever the total cost of bringing the poor into the new system, it will
rise by roughly the percentage of additional subsidy afforded. Providing a
subsidy of 120 percent of the benchmark premium, for example, may raise
total federal expenditures by up to 20 percent. This will require additional
revenue sources, thereby placing greater burdens on taxpayers. The concept
of "inter-socioeconomic equity" refers to the perceived fairness of allowing
the poor and unemployed to jump the queue to the most costly plan in the
Alliance. That plan may be beyond the reach of many working and middle-
class individuals, who may perceive it as unjust for persons who are poorer
than they, and who may not work, to obtain a "better" health plan.
Between the two extremes of a subsidy at the benchmark level and a sub-
sidy tied to the most expensive plan would be a subsidy somewhere in the
middle. In an Alliance that allowed a 20 percent band, for example, the fed-
eral subsidy would be set between 105 and 110 percent of the benchmark
premium.
A final possible method of creating greater equality would be to issue
rules that ensure a fair distribution of the subsidized populations. These
would require each health plan to accept a certain percentage of subsidized
individuals and families. The difference in cost could be made up by the Alli-
ance, or each plan could distribute the cost among all of its consumers. In
this latter scenario, more expensive plans could better afford to absorb the
subsidized group.
In the absence of adequate safeguards, other features of the new system
might perpetuate inequities. Consider, for example, the effect of a federal
subsidy that was rigidly tied to the benchmark premium (as it may have to be
for financial and political reasons). It is quite possible that some health plans
will strongly compete to become the least expensive plan. Competition, of
course, could be highly beneficial if plans competed on the basis of quality.
Health plans, however, might set themselves up more like "Medicaid mills."
They might reason that providing services in poorer areas could become
quite lucrative because: (1) the new system would have developed a large
market of consumers with a federally guaranteed payment to health plans; (2)
poorer populations often are less likely to visit their physicians and seek so-
phisticated services than are more informed and wealthier consumers; and (3)
managed care might provide an opportunity to design a plan that significantly
impedes access to services.
Another consequence of a federal subsidy tied to the benchmark pre-
mium is that it limits choice so rigidly that it compromises a poor person's
ability to act as an educated consumer. Poor people cannot "vote with their
dollars" and choose another plan if the benchmark plan provides an unsatis-
fying experience. Subsidies tied to the benchmark premium might also jeop-
ardize security and continuity of care because, as health plans compete to be
the least expensive plan in the Alliance, new plans may become the bench-
mark from year-to-year. Subsidized patients may be obligated to change
plans and physicians in order to move to the plan that happens to be the least
expensive plan each year. The President's clear commitment to choice, secur-
ity, and continuity of care should assure that these inequities and indignities
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for the poor never develop. However, competition of any kind (even if it is
effectively managed) poses a risk to the poor who cannot compete.
One of the best guarantees of equity will be the national requirement for
community rating. The question arises, however, as to how "the community"
is defined. The more the system allows groups to "opt out," the greater the
risk to the concept of community rating. Large employers with a thousand or
more employees may be able to opt out of the new system. While they proba-
bly will be required to community rate, their "community" would be limited
to their own employees. Industries with a younger, wealthier, and healthier
workforce would have a strong incentive to self-insure or form their own Alli-
ance. This is certainly not disadvantageous for employees of those companies
who may receive a more generous benefits package at lower cost. It might,
however, "skim off" segments of healthy populations within an Alliance area,
leaving the Alliance to cover a smaller, less healthy population. Opt-outs for
large companies may be a political necessity to obtain the support of large
corporations and trade unions, but these trade-offs will negatively affect the
equity of health care coverage.
C. JUSTICE
A just health care system incorporates both substantive and procedural
aspects of justice. Distributive justice requires a fair sharing of benefits and
burdens. A just distribution of benefits and burdens does not require an
equal sharing; when individuals with different needs and means receive the
same level of services and pay the same, the system is distinctly unjust.
Benefits of health care must be distributed on the basis of need: those
with greater needs receive greater services. A needs-based system ensures
that those who are ill receive all reasonable services to restore their function-
ing and relieve their pain and suffering. It must also be open and accounta-
ble, and provide due process for individuals or groups who are denied
benefits.
For these reasons, the governance of Health Alliances and AHPs is of
central importance to consumers of health services. Health Alliances will be
quasi-governmental organizations that exercise fundamental powers on be-
half of the state. The activities of Health Alliances powerfully affect the inter-
ests of consumers: (1) Financial - the honesty and effectiveness of Health
Alliances as purchasing agents directly affect the cost and quality of health
care; if Health Alliances contract with AHPs that have inflated costs or infer-
ior-quality services, consumers are harmed; (2) Quality assurance - the rigor
with which Health Alliances monitor the quality of health plans and publish
the results will affect the health and safety of consumers; (3) Autonomy - the
amount of useful information about health plans published by Health Alli-
ances directly affects the ability of consumers to make informed choices
among competing health plans.
Health Alliances carry out the functions of government in these and
other meaningful ways. The more Health Alliances act like government, the
more important openness and public accountability to consumers become.
The concept of open and accountable governance does not indicate con-
sumer ownership. Rather, it requires direct or indirect electoral accountabil-
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ity so that appointments are made by the governor or other elected officials;
formal mechanisms are in place for meaningful consumer participation in
decisionmaking; and Alliances publicly disclose information about their fi-
nancing and operations.
Health plans do not act like government in the same way as Alliances, yet
they do have equally powerful effects on the interests of consumers of health
services. They are also much closer to the community and the daily lives of
consumers. Consumer participation in governance becomes more meaning-
ful at the local level, where decisions affect individuals and groups who seek
quality health care. If consumers are dissatisfied with their health plans, many
will have the opportunity to move to another plan. Some consumers, how-
ever, will not have the same opportunities for choice. There may only be one,
or very few, plans in some rural communities, and poorer or subsidized popu-
lations may not be able to afford to join another plan. Where choice is lim-
ited, the case for effective participation in governance and decisionmaking
becomes stronger.
As health services are delivered within health plans, disagreements and
disputes will inevitably arise among consumers, health care providers, and
administrators. There are many reasons why it is important for the new
health care system to anticipate conflict and design structures and procedures
to resolve conflicts and adjudicate disputes. There is an intrinsic value to fair
procedures for individuals and groups who are adversely affected by decisions
involving their health care.4 2 The due process right to be heard allows ag-
grieved persons to influence the decisionmaking process, "an opportunity
that expresses their dignity as persons." 4 3 Regardless of the outcome, the
intrinsic value of a due process hearing derives from participation in a deci-
sion that affects the person and the knowledge of reasons for that decision. 4 4
Fair procedures are also warranted as a means of arriving at a reliable
outcome that is based on full and accurate information and consistent stan-
dards. With a fair hearing, an impartial decisionmaker, guided by objective
criteria, can assemble all of the relevant evidence and come to a more in-
formed conclusion. The trade-off for establishing fair procedures (depending
on how elaborate they are) is the introduction of a formalized, adversarial
system, with its added complexities, costs, and delays.
The design of thoughtful alternative dispute resolution procedures for
each health plan can help avoid litigation. Ultimately, however, aggrieved in-
dividuals need access to courts and a fair hearing. At the same time, some
courts may have a bias in favor of ordering the provision of treatment even
when the cost is extremely high and the benefits unestablished. If managed
care is going to work, consumers ought not to be afforded a right to any and
all treatments they may desire.
In the end, a just system is measured by how fairly it distributes the bene-
fits of health care and the costs of paying for it, as well as the way in which it
operates - with integrity, objectivity, openness, and fair procedures. The
42 Professor Laurence Tribe discusses the notion of intrinsic value in the due process right to
be heard in LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 666-67 (2d ed. 1988).
43 Id. at 666.
44 See id.
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new health care system should distribute scarce resources on the basis of
need and the benefits to be accrued from treatment; it should distribute the
burdens based primarily on the ability to pay; and it should be publicly ac-
countable and fair in its dealings with consumers.
D. CHOICE
For many consumers and physicians, the concept of "choice" has become
the critical yardstick with which to measure a new health care system. The
importance of protecting, respecting, and making effective individual choices
has strong ethical roots in the literature of health reform and ethics. The
ethical principle of respect for persons recognizes people as autonomous
agents and requires that their choices be observed.
"Choice," however, is a much more complicated concept in the health
care reform debate. Choice can refer to access to health care generally, to
health plans, to health care providers, or to treatments. In each case, the
concept of choice is fraught with complexity and trade-offs. A decision to
afford more choice to certain persons for certain purposes can deny choice to
other persons for other purposes.
The choice of whether or not to receive health care is restricted by a
person's ability to pay, as well as non-financial barriers. Providing a legal en-
titlement to health care, with a federal subsidy for those unable to afford
health care, ensures choice at a fundamental level. However, the choice of
plans, providers, or treatments can arise only after a person gains access to
the health care system. If guaranteeing choice to all patients who already
have health care means denying access to others, would this provide a net
increase, or diminution, of choice? Managed care, for example, usually di-
minishes a person's choice of physicians, but costs less than fee-for-service
plans. If the health care system could provide universal access to health care,
thereby making greater use of managed care, it would increase choice for
some and decrease it for others.
Choice can also be measured by the number of opportunities to choose
among competing health plans. Used in this way, choice is enhanced by hav-
ing a number of competing plans that offer quality services. Informed choice
is also enhanced by full and accurate information about the costs and quality
of the services that plans offer. Managed competition, properly designed and
implemented, can facilitate choice among plans. 45 In some areas, however,
the size of the population would not support more than one plan, and some
poorer consumers would not be able to afford to choose more costly plans.
In these situations, financial constraints may prevent us from offering choice.
Most people define "choice" as the right to select a primary care physi-
cian or a specialist when they need medical attention. Underlying this defini-
tion is the great reliance that they place on the trust established in a
physician-patient relationship. Moreover, educated American consumers
often believe that they can accurately select physicians with greater qualifica-
tions and experience. A great deal of choice, understood in this sense, is built
45 Some employers in the present system impose managed care on employees, thereby de-
priving them of a choice of health plan.
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into the President's plan for the health care system. Choice of physicians will
be ensured at several levels: (1) one free-choice-of-provider, fee-for-service
plan is likely to be present within each Health Alliance; (2) consumers will be
entitled to register with the plan that includes their personal physician, and
can transfer if their physician leaves the plan; and (3) if a consumer does not
have a personal physician, he or she will be able to choose one from among
those offered by health plans, using detailed information about the physi-
cians' backgrounds and experience. Choosing a physician through a free-
choice-of-provider indemnity plan should accurately reflect the true costs of
that unfettered choice. Health Alliances can help control costs by inviting
competitive bidding to select one insurer to operate a fee-for-service plan.
At first glance, giving patients a choice of treatments may appear rela-
tively uncontroversial. The doctrine of informed consent appears to guaran-
tee patients full information about treatment alternatives and the right to
determine their preferred course of treatment. While it may be true that
competent patients have the right to decline any treatment, it does not follow
that informed consent affords a right to any treatment that the patient
chooses. In fact, a patient's treatment choice is constrained by many factors;
the new system would merely carry over many current limits and may increase
limits in other areas. Currently, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
must approve pharmaceuticals; the physician must believe the treatment is
beneficial (e.g., physicians may not offer off-label uses for some drugs); and
insurers must agree to pay for the treatment (e.g., companies may refuse to
reimburse for experimental treatments). Conflicts regarding patients' treat-
ment choices have occurred in a variety of settings, and have involved persons
with AIDS or other incurable conditions who were seeking access to unap-
proved therapies that offered a slim hope of relief or recovery, 46 as well as
patients and family members who were seeking "futile" treatments, such as
life support, for persons in a persistent vegetative state.
4 7
Patients have expressed particular concerns about treatment limitations
imposed under managed care systems. While there is little evidence that it
offsets quality, the increased use of managed care under the new system may
lead to added worries about limits on treatment choice. Additionally, the Na-
tional Health Board may issue practice guidelines that limit or eliminate the
use of certain treatments that are costly and offer little or no benefit.
The features of the new system designed to save money by limiting the
use of less effective and more costly treatments (e.g., practice guidelines and
managed care) will restrict choice to some extent. In doing so, the system
may use the resources that are saved to guarantee choice in other areas and
improve overall quality.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS REGARDING U.S. HEALTH CARE
REFORM
The ethical values of access, equity, justice, and choice are of central im-
portance in measuring President Clinton's plan for a new health care system.
46See, e.g., Weaver v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1989).
47 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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Many who have written about and advocated health care reform might agree
with these evaluative standards, but choose to compare the President's plan
to a single-payer system, like Canada's, rather than to the status quo, as I have
done. Certainly, a single-payer system might achieve the goals of health care
reform as well as - or better than - the form of managed competition with a
budget that has emerged from the Presidential Task Force. However, a sin-
gle-payer system imposed by the federal government may not be politically
feasible without support from the President. In fact, it may never have been
feasible given the deeply entrenched American patterns that tie health care to
employment and the insurance industry.
The years 1993-1994 may produce the most important domestic social
reform since the New Deal. President Clinton's plan, even with its trade-offs
and limitations, can produce enormous social good for millions of Americans
by enhancing their access to care, reducing the inequities in the health care
system, allocating benefits and burdens more justly, and expanding choice
along many dimensions. As years of careful thinking and writing on health
care reform turn into a season of political debate and decision, the ethical
dimensions regarding the value of health care in the daily lives of Americans
need to be carefully weighed.
IV. IMPLEMENTING U.S. HEALTH CARE REFORM: A SYMPOSIUM
The distinguished authors in this Symposium prepared their Articles in
advance of the Presidential Task Force's proposal, and bring a great deal of
clarity and insight into the central issues that will emerge from the debate on
health care reform. All contribute important perspectives to the nationwide
dialogue that invariably accompanies reform of this magnitude.
The first Article is written by Princeton economist Uwe E. Reinhardt. In
Reforming the Health Care System. The Universal Dilemma, Professor Reinhardt
takes an all-embracing view of the worldwide problems in health care deliv-
ery. He then examines the economic and social peculiarities of the United
States that have thus far prevented major reform. Professor Reinhardt's con-
clusion recognizes the prevailing trends in the United States and other indus-
trialized nations. He identifies a worldwide standard of health care delivery
toward which all health systems appear to be converging. Following Profes-
sor Reinhardt's economic perspective, Professor Troyen Brennan of the
Harvard School of Public Health presents An Ethical Perspective on Health Care
Insurance Reform. Professor Brennan, a medical practitioner, draws on the eth-
ical imperatives that are ingrained in the medical profession for guidance in
molding and implementing today's health insurance reforms.
The next three Articles examine specific health insurance reform propos-
als and their feasibility as components of a comprehensive, nationwide reform
package. In Canadian Medicare: Can It Work in the United States? Will It Survive
in Canada?, Professor Raisa Deber of the University of Toronto dispels some
popular myths about the Canadian system and identifies how its present con-
straints would translate in the United States. Professors Timothy Jost and
Sandra Tanenbaum from the Ohio State University School of Law propose
ways to obtain broad-based acceptance of a single-payer, global budget sys-
tem in their Article, Selling Cost Containment. Their proposal is especially perti-
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nent to the nationwide support that will be necessary to implement the
Clinton plan. Finally, in Regulation and Federalism. Legal Impediments to State
Health Care Reform, Professor Wendy Parmet of Northeastern University
School of Law details the basis for and barriers to state-based initiatives in
health insurance reform. Her discussion is important in light of the Clinton
plan's increase in state flexibility to act as "laboratories" for health insurance
reform.
Two supplemental pieces, a student Note by Boston University School of
Law's Ronald Wisor, Jr., and a book review by Widener University School of
Law Professor Barry Furrow, narrow the Symposium's focus even further to
consider specific aspects of health care delivery in the United States. In Com-
munity Care, Competition and Coercion. A Legal Perspective on Privatized Mental
Health Care, Mr. Wisor examines the privatization of mental health care, while
Professor Furrow's Guest Book Review: Cystic Fibrosis and DNA Tests evaluates a
report by the Office of Technology Assessment ("OTA") on genetic screen-
ing for cystic fibrosis. With the OTA's study of one disease and its examina-
tion of health insurers' attitudes about screening technologies, Professor
Furrow brings the Symposium full circle. He discusses the competitive priori-
ties that shape today's health insurance market, and further highlights the
importance of implementing nationwide health care reform.
